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Regine Paul 
Analyse and rule? A conceptual framework for 
explaining the variable appeals of ex-ante 
evaluation in policymaking 
Abstract 
This article integrates disparate explanations for
increasing (but variable) turns to ex-ante policy
evaluation, such as risk analysis, across public ad-
ministrations. So far unconnected silos of literature
– on policy tools, policy instrumentation, the poli-
tics of evaluation and the political sociology of 
quantification – inconsistently portray ex-ante
evaluation as rational problem-solving, symbolic
actions of institutional self-defence, or (less often)
political power-seeking. I synthesise these explana-
tions in an interpretivist and institutionalist reading
of ex-ante evaluation as contextually filtered pro-
cess of selective meaning-making. From this meth-
odological umbrella emerges my unified typology
of ex-ante evaluation as instrumental problem-
solving (I), legitimacy-seeking (L) and power-
seeking (P). I argue that a) these ideal-types co-
exist in policymakers’ reasoning about the ex-
pected merits of ex-ante evaluation, whilst b) di-
verse institutional contexts will favour variable
weightings of I, L and P in policymaking. By
means of systematisation the typology seeks to in-
spire an interdisciplinary research agenda on varie-
ties of ex-ante evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: policy tools, policy evaluation, politics
of evaluation, institutionalism, interpretive policy
analysis 
 Zusammenfassung 
Ein integrierter Erklärungsansatz für die variable 
Hinwendung zu ex-ante Evaluierungstools in der 
Politikgestaltung 
Der Beitrag entwirft einen integrierten Analyserah-
men für das Phänomen der zunehmenden und zu-
gleich variablen Hinwendung zu Instrumenten der
ex-ante Politikevaluation, beispielsweise der risiko-
basierten Entscheidungsvorbereitung, in vielen poli-
tisch-administrativen Systemen. Bisher unverbunde-
ne und oft kontrastierende Literaturen – zu policy 
tools, policy instrumentation, Evaluationspolitik, aber
auch der politischen Soziologie der Quantifizierung –
konzeptualisieren ex-ante Evaluation als rationale 
Problemlösung, symbolische Handlung institutionel-
ler Selbstverteidigung oder (seltener) politisches
Machtspiel. Der Beitrag synthetisiert solche schein-
bar konträren Erklärungsansätze in einer interpretati-
vistischen und institutionalistischen Lesart, nach wel-
cher Akteure des politisch-administrativen Systems 
den Toolkits der ex-ante Evaluation drei verschiedene 
Leistungsversprechen – instrumentelle Problemlö-
sung, Legitimitätsbeschaffung und Machtgewinn
(ILP-Typologie) – zumessen. Der Beitrag argumen-
tiert, dass a) diese drei Idealtypen in der Bedeutungs-
zuweisung an ex-ante Evaluationsinstrumente immer 
ko-existieren, b) diverse institutionelle Kontextbedin-
gungen allerdings eine unterschiedliche Gewichtung
der respektiven I-, L- und P-Interpretationsrahmen in 
der Politikgestaltung begünstigen. Durch Systemati-
sierung bisher nebeneinanderstehender Forschungs-
stränge soll die integrierte Typologie eine interdiszip-
linäre Forschungsagenda zu Variation von Politikeva-
luation und Evaluationspolitik inspirieren. 
 
Schlagworte: Politikinstrumente, Politikevaluation,
Evaluationspolitik, Institutionalismus, interpreta-
tive Policyanalyse 
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1 Introduction 
For some decades now, governments and public administrations across the globe have 
invested heavily in analytical tool-sheds for assessing policy options before decision-
making. Famous examples include President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 of 1981, 
requiring that all US legislation be pre-examined with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(Posner, 2001), or the English demand that all regulatory enforcement activities be pri-
oritised through systematic risk analysis (Hampton, 2005). There is also increased 
promotion of such tools by international organisations (for risk analysis see: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2010).  
Scholars have recently started examining ex-ante evaluation tools, too (e.g., Atkin-
son, 2015; Black, 2005; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2016; Radaelli, 2005; 2010; Rothstein, 
Borraz & Huber, 2013) and thus revive their foundational role in the birth of the policy 
sciences in the tradition of Harold D. Lasswell1. And yet: we so far find rather contra-
dictory and scattered conceptual answers to the question why exactly such tools appeal 
to policymakers and how their appeal varies across contexts: 
 
‒ On the one hand, standard definitions of so-called “policy-analytical methods” (I 
adopt the term from Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson & Rayner, 2015, p. 4) in policy 
studies suggest they fulfil a predominantly instrumental role in policymaking far 
off political attention or infighting2. CBA and its cousins count as precursors for 
policy formulation and adoption. By analysing policy problems and proposed solu-
tions before decision-making they “[generate] options about what to do about a 
public problem” (Howlett, 2011, p. 29).  
‒ On the other hand, such a technocratic and instrumental conceptualisation of the ap-
peal of ex-ante evaluation is fiercely contradicted in the literature on policy evalua-
tion and instrumentation (Weiss, 1973, 1993; Linder & Peters, 1989; Peters, 2002; 
Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007; Kassim & Le Galès, 2010; Raimondo, 2018). Scholars 
in these fields have amply highlighted the political nature of the design, choice and 
use of evaluation and policy tools. Read jointly, as this article will, these literatures 
suggest that ex-ante evaluation involves what I call positional struggles over organi-
sational legitimacy, power and political influence in a policy domain.  
‒ In addition, both the policy studies and the policy tools literature disregard insights 
from the political sociology of quantification, though it offers great analytical 
mileage for specifying the argumentative underpinnings of legitimatory and power-
oriented turns to ex-ante evaluation among public administration actors. 
 
This article argues that we need a systematic integration of insights from across these 
so far unconnected silos of literature to explain the increasing but contextually variable 
rise of ex-ante evaluation. Building on the issue’s reflections on ‘varieties of evalua-
tion’, I contribute a unified analytical framework for explaining the adoption of policy-
analytical methods as stemming from administrators’/policymakers’3 contextualised 
perceptions of their likely ability to pursue different sets of goals. I propose a unified 
typology4 of instrumental problem-solving (I), legitimacy-seeking (L) and power-
seeking (P) to capture the duality of instrumental and more political adoptions of ex-
ante evaluation frameworks. My interpretivist premise is that to adopt ex-ante evalua-
tive tools is a powerful act of interpreting and pre-structuring the socio-political world 
as it is to be known and governed against existing structural conditions.  
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To develop the conceptual-analytical argument, the article first reviews existing ty-
pologies of policy tools and evaluation uses. On that basis, it conceptualises the adop-
tion of ex-ante evaluation tools as multidimensional acts of institutionally embedded 
but selective meaning-making on the part of policymakers (section 2). On that termino-
logical and conceptual footing, the article then carves out the three ideal types (section 
3-5) – my ILP typology –  and develops expectations about the institutional contexts in 
which meaning-making actors will vest instrumental, legitimatory or power-seeking 
goals in the adoption of ex-ante evaluation. I illustrate the logic of each ideal type 
through the example of risk-analytical frameworks, a case well-charted in scholarly 
work. The article last maps out how the unified typology can stimulate a future re-
search agenda on varieties of ex-ante evaluation by examining interactions between 
and the dynamic evolution of types over time (section 6). 
2 Ex-ante evaluation as institutionally embedded but selective 
act of meaning-making 
To anchor my conceptual approach to policymakers’ motivations for adopting ex-ante 
evaluation I start with a brief review of existing typologies of policy tools and evalua-
tion. This also highlights this article’s contribution in bridging disparate literatures with 
a distinct interpretivist and institutionalist framework. 
2.1 Typologies of policy tools and evaluation uses 
In the policy tools literature, typologisation has long focused on different kinds of tools 
for achieving a nominal policy goal. This is exemplified in the discussion of “carrots, 
sticks, and sermons” (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist & Vedung, 2011) but also Christopher 
Hood’s (1983) NATO typology of substantial policy tools with four different vantage 
points for behaviour change (nodality, authority, treasure and organisation). These ty-
pologies assume that civil servants within the public administration have a rational 
view on how a specific tool will achieve a policy goal at the lowest cost, least visibility 
and most effective targeting of regulatees (for example, incentives for self-regulation 
vs. sanctioned prohibitions). While such theorisation implies that context will shape 
perceptions of the appropriateness of tools (both among regulatees and public admin-
istration actors), it does not theorise context as an independent variable. 
Calls to contextualise policy tool choice in institutionalist perspectives include Pe-
ters’s argument that tools do not pre-exist ‘conceptualised and defined’ and ready to be 
picked for problem-solving. Instead, they constitute ‘their own politics’ in interaction 
with empirical settings (Peters, 2002, p. 553). A more recent discussion of tool choice 
(Capano & Lippi, 2017) confirms that “neither legitimacy nor instrumentality is objec-
tively given, but is perceived by decisionmakers in a subjective manner, depending on 
the context in which they act and make decisions” (p. 271). Their typology systematis-
es decision-makers’ perception of tools as an attempt to balance between the expected 
instrumentality of a tool and its perceived legitimacy. Missing, however, is a systemat-
ic integration of power-political drivers of tools choice. While the authors acknowledge 
that a tool “allocates opportunities and duties, creates values or symbols, as well as 
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stakes, and also distributes costs and benefits” (ibid., p. 279), they offer no explanation 
of how power-related perceptions might variably interact with policymakers’ instru-
mental and legitimatory motivations. 
Claudio Radaelli’s (2010) discussion of ‘four images’ of regulatory impact assess-
ment (RIA) (2010) distinguishes rational policymaking (=instrumental), symbolic ac-
tion (=legitimatory), control of the bureaucracy and public management reform. Con-
trol of the bureaucracy type arguments, however, suggest a power-political dimension 
with actors in multi-level politico-administrative regimes negotiating the room for 
manoeuvring between policy decisions and implementation (Radaelli, 2010, pp. 169, 
172 f.). It is less clear how public management reform forms a distinct ideal type, as 
arguably the goals of such reform have been well shown to connect to all of the other 
ideas (rational problem-solving, control of the bureaucracy and legitimatory symbolic 
action) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Convincingly, Radaelli develops specific hypothe-
ses about how variable institutional contexts – such as dominant ‘administrative mod-
els’, the degree of decentralisation, or the power of the central executive – shape uses 
of regulatory impact assessment (see sections 3-5). 
Critical evaluation studies produced context-sensitive conceptualisations of poli-
cymakers’ evaluation use (Weiss, 1973; 1993). Political contexts shape the extent to 
which evaluations are used “(a) instrumentally, to give direction to policy and practice; 
(b) politically or symbolically, to justify pre-existing preferences and actions, and (c) 
conceptually, to provide new generalizations, ideas, or concepts that are useful for 
making sense of the policy scene.” (Weiss, Murphy-Graham & Birkeland, 2005, p. 13, 
highlight added) However, this taxonomy, based on extensive empirical research, re-
mains disconnected from systematic theorisation of how institutional contexts shape 
the charted variety. Political science readings of evaluation provide such comparative 
systematisation. Christina Boswell (2008, p. 471), for example, argues that the preva-
lence of a) legitimatory orientations and/or b) policymakers’ attempts to substantiate 
their pre-existing policy preferences over c) rational-instrumental perspectives on ex-
pert knowledge depends on the perceived stability and source of an organisations’ le-
gitimacy (claim a) as well as the degree of contention and mode of settlement with re-
gard to policy goals (claim b). Read jointly, existing typologies highlight the multidi-
mensionality of policymakers’ perceptions of policy tools/evaluative frameworks and 
(to a lesser extent) the relevance of institutional contexts for shaping these perceptions.  
2.2 An interpretivist framework for building a unified typology 
I propose an interpretivist policy analysis framework (e.g. Stone, 2012; Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006) to explain policymakers’ variable (sets of) motivations for adopt-
ing tools of ex-ante evaluation. This means 1) to treat the diversity of motivations de-
scribed in existing typologies not as mutually exclusive but as assemblages of meaning in 
policymakers’ sense-making processes, and 2) to systematise explanations of variety via 
a focus on the institutional embeddedness of sense-making processes. Rather than assum-
ing instrumental problem-solving to be a dominant motivator of ex-ante evaluation, ana-
lysts must deconstruct its empirical relevance in a multidimensional semiotic space 
through careful interpretive analysis. To systematise the relevant semiotic dimensions as 
idealtypical yardsticks in a unified typology is the first key contribution of this article.  
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In so doing my interpretive perspective contributes, second, a nuancing of expected 
variety. Interpretivists have not only stressed the ambiguity and multiplicity of mean-
ings vested in policies (and tools) but also the co-existence of substantial interpreta-
tions of policies with perceptions about policies’ implications for positional struggles 
in a domain (Béland, 2009; Carmel, 2019). As discussed above, ex-ante evaluation’s 
perceived appeal as a tool in power struggles has been rather underdeveloped in exist-
ing typologies. My typology therefore expands existing work – usually involving an in-
strumental and legitimacy-related (or symbolic) dimension – with a distinct focus on 
power-seeking.  
Third, I contribute a set of expectations on how policymakers’ perceptions of ex-
ante evaluation interact with their specific institutional contexts. Institutions are under-
stood here as both formal (as in the constitutional set-up of a polity and formal interac-
tions between key actors) and informal (specific norms about state-market interactions 
etc.) rules of interactions in a given context which shape, according to various readings 
of neo-institutionalism, actors’ preferences, senses of appropriateness as well as fuel-
ling path dependencies over time (Hall & Taylor, 1996). These include, for the purpos-
es of our debate, key markers of ‘politico-administrative regimes’ (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2011), including constitutional relationships between actors in unitary or federalised 
polities, degrees of centralisation or decentralisation, and the formal relationships of 
accountability and competition that emerge from such institutional diversity. They also 
concern the influence of dominant policy types and policy styles in diverse settings. As 
part of my conceptualisation around the ILP typology (sections 3-5), I theorise how 
policymakers’ perceptions of ex-ante evaluation will vary alongside diverse institution-
al contexts and their attempts of negotiating (and potentially also re-make) their own 
position within these contexts.  
3 Ideal type I: instrumental problem-solving 
Studies on the policymaking process and policy change but also rational choice in-
spired accounts of policy(-analytical) tools highlight the instrumental appeal of CBA 
and its cousins in fulfilling pre-set policy goals. They also specify how exactly ex-ante 
evaluation triggers policymakers’ problem-solving orientations through their distinct 
ability of screening possible solutions to a policy problem before decision-making.  
3.1 Policy tools as instrumental problem-solvers 
Influential theories of the policy process and policy change situate policy tools – and 
policy-analytical tools – near the bottom within a hierarchy of scales of change. This is 
true for both the concept of policy paradigm change (Hall, 1993) and the advocacy coa-
litions framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) which design causally 
complex but yet hierarchically ordered heuristics of the policy process with a rather 
marginal and unpolitical role for tools (let alone analytical tools). Tool choice, design 
and calibration appear as functionally subordinated to politically inaugurated policy 
goals and wider ideational frameworks. Indeed, in Hall’s conceptual world of policy 
paradigms, tools belong in the realm of rather apolitical ‘normal policymaking’ occur-
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ring far off the (assumingly analytically more interesting) scenes of (rare) sweeping 
paradigmatic change. It is in that sense that a hierarchal view of policy change “re-
mains the essence of positivistic notions of rationality in policy analytical theory” even 
in ideational scholarly work otherwise well able to capture causal complexity beyond 
linear policy models (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 393, highlight added).  
Scholars of policy tools echo the instrumental view on policy tools when assuming 
a neat alignment of tools with pre-set goals. This view dominates Hood’s seminal The 
Tools of Government where he writes that “it is by applying its tools that government 
makes the link between wish and fulfilment”5 (Hood, 1983, p. 8). Those adopting 
methods of ex-ante evaluation can hence be expected to seek enforcement of this link 
by founding each decision on analytical evidence before the fact. This assumed instru-
mentality of policy-analytical methods in the policymaking process also resonates with 
the idea of an “anticipatory policy style” where (analytical) expertise rationalises bu-
reaucratic decision-making and prevents knee-jerk ‘reactive’ responses to public opin-
ion (Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982; Howlett & Tosun, 2018). 
Focusing on the instrumental relationship between policy purposes (ends or goals) – 
the normative decisions about what a policy should aim to achieve – and the means se-
lected to achieve an end (tools) is still in vogue. A recent study on policy tool change in 
the European Union (EU) captures policy instruments with Hood’s (then) thirty-year-old 
definition: as “means and techniques in order to achieve policy goals” (Bähr, 2010, p. 
15). Once decided upon in political struggles, it seems in such accounts, dominant idea-
tional “prisms through which policymakers [see]” (Hall, 1993, p. 279) policy problems 
trickle down to determine their perception of the likely performance of (analytical) tools.  
3.2 Ex-ante evaluation as solution screening 
The framing of evaluative tools in other parts of the literature – the studies discussed so 
far do not include evaluation tools – joins the instrumental proposition. CBA, risk anal-
ysis and RIA, for example, count –  according to scholarly observers (Viscusi, 1983; 
Baldwin & Veljanovski, 1984; Sunstein, 2000; Posner, 2001; Majone, 2010; Radaelli, 
2010) – as evaluation mechanisms for establishing, before decision-making, whether 
proposed (subsets of) policies are likely to achieve policy goals (effectiveness), wheth-
er they can do so in a cost-effective manner (efficiency) and without undesired adverse 
consequences (impact). In the instrumental reading, analytical tools thus serve as 
screening devices to identify rational policy solutions. 
Giandomenico Majone, for example, argues that to apply the same analytical for-
mula across regulatory issues6 will make decision-making more consistent, avoid over- 
and under-regulation and equalise the treatment of regulatees (also see Viscusi, 1983, 
Sunstein, 2002). Policymaking and enforcement thus “become technical matters of cal-
culation, policy-oriented scientific discourses that transcend political contests” (Tombs 
& Whyte, 2013, p. 67). Whilst related de-politicisation agendas have been rightly cri-
tiqued, for example in the case of risk analysis (e.g., Shrader-Frechette, 1990; Stone, 
2012), the ability of ex-ante evaluation to ‘rationalise’ decision-making may well be 
instrumental from a problem-solving viewpoint.  
Exemplary is the use of risk analysis in the United Kingdom (UK). Adhering to the 
cost-effectiveness goals of ex-ante evaluation, a parliamentary review suggests regulators 
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across all policy domains use “risk assessment to concentrate resources on the areas that 
need them most” (Hampton, 2005, p. 7). Since the approach gained statutory force in 
2008 through the “Regulators’ Compliance Code” (Rothstein et al., 2019), UK policy-
makers must escalate their interventions proportionally with risk level. An enthusiastic 
promoter of this approach, the Health and Safety Executive turned to ex-ante evaluation 
already in the late 1980s to ensure that the cost, time and effort required to achieve pre-
set regulatory goals (work risk reduction in the case of the HSE) be not grossly dispro-
portionate to the benefit gained in its regulations and enforcement policies (ibid.). This 
example provides, at first sight, a textbook-like adoption of instrumental ex-ante evalua-
tion, but its re-consideration throughout the article equally illustrates the multiplicity of 
rationales policymakers and policy operators vest in ex-ante evaluation tools. 
3.3 Institutional contexts to favour instrumental appeals 
An instrumental perspective on ex-ante evaluation is likely to emerge in contexts 
where policymakers perceive problem-solving as their genuine goal. This claim may 
seem mundane, but its relevance will become obvious in distinction from non-
instrumental goals of evaluation (legitimacy-seeking and power-seeking) in the subse-
quent sections. Based on existing typologies of policymaking/administrative decision-
making I theorise the institutional conditions to favour policymakers’ instrumental in-
terpretations of ex-ante evaluation. 
The classic policy styles distinction (Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982, p. 
13) suggests analytical tools’ currency to be rising in settings with an anticipatory poli-
cy style whereas those with reactive policy styles will not use ex-ante evaluation for in-
strumental reasons (they may well use analysis to legitimate decisions ex-post, of 
course). While the original typology has been theoretically and empirically extended 
(Howlett & Tosun, 2018), comparative public administration reform research indicates 
persisting variation as to the relative openness of different politico-administrative sys-
tems to expertise and sciences-led bureaucratic decision-making in line with policy 
style type arguments (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). For example, in his comparative 
analysis of RIA, Radaelli suggests that this tool will emerge as a form of rational prob-
lem-solving in contexts with a ‘strong evaluation culture’ (2010, p. 174). 
In a similar vein, Theodore Lowi’s policy types (1972) associate regulatory poli-
cies with the strongest role for expertise (this could include pre-decision analysis) 
while distributive and redistributive policies follow interest group and partisan politics 
logics, respectively. Even though very much focused on US-American policymaking, 
Lowi’s typology implies that ex-ante evaluation as instrumental problem-solving might 
feature strongly in cases of regulatory policymaking, either where a domain leans to-
wards regulatory interventions as a whole and/or because the political setting overall is 
prone to use regulation (Majone, 1994; Moran, 2003). Exemplary is, again, the British 
administration which, since the 1990s (Black, 2005; Dodds, 2006), has sought to re-
spond to “alleged over-regulation, legalism, inflexibility and an alleged absence of at-
tention being paid to the costs of regulation” (Hutter, 2005, p. 1) with the development 
of analytical frameworks for decision-making.  
As resource pressure, notions of regulatory crisis and related modernisation agen-
das have been wide-spread phenomena (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) the instrumental 
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promises of ex-ante evaluation are likely to gain purchase elsewhere, too. Indeed, the 
discussion of reform trajectories in different politico-administrative regimes suggests 
the role of evaluation to be particularly relevant in Neo-Weberian state modernizers 
(ibid., pp. 168 f.). Accordingly, New Public Management reformer regimes, associated 
with strict principal-agent-accountability relationships, are likely to use analysis as one 
of the tools to aid politicians set strategic policy goals and increase the political control 
over the bureaucracy (as for RIA in the UK, Radaelli, 2010). In the absence of the con-
trol requirements associated with agencification (Döhler, 2002) policymakers within a 
hierarchically-integrated administration will rather adopt ex-ante evaluation as an ex-
pertise-driven technical implementation aid. 
4 Ideal type L: legitimacy-seeking 
This section draws together insights from various branches of research which adopt a 
sociological institutionalist perspective on policy tools, evaluation and specific meth-
ods of quantification (such as risk analysis or CBA). Inspired by neo-institutionalist so-
ciology, such research interprets the adoption of ex-ante evaluation as policymakers’ 
endogenous sense-making about the ‘appropriateness’ of different paths of action 
(March & Olsen, 1989, p. 23). Though few studies (Black, 2005; Rothstein, Huber & 
Gaskell, 2006; Radaelli, 2010) address the question of ex-ante forms of evaluation and 
its drivers explicitly, the joint review enables me to carve out a ‘legitimacy-seeking’ 
ideal type of ex-ante evaluation.  
4.1 Policy tools and evaluations as legitimacy boosters 
Institutionalist scholars of policy tools have, for some time now, claimed that consider-
ations of “institutional self-interest” and the stability and legitimacy of the respective 
administrative organisation (Peters, 2002, pp. 557 f.) co-motivates policymakers’ tool 
adoptions. The literature on the politics of instrumentation specifies this general propo-
sition by arguing that any policy tool implies specific regulatory concepts which can 
help (re-)structure (strategically or unintendedly so) both the accountability relation-
ships between administrators and regulatees and the ascription of authority in a policy 
domain (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007). In other words: tools come with distinct ideas 
about who is to be held accountable, affecting the perception of legitimacy of an ad-
ministration, as well as ideas about who should legitimately be in charge.  
Correspondingly, the instrument constituencies literature assumes actors from 
across most diverse organisations (government departments, international organisa-
tions, NGOs, interest groups, scientific associations, the media etc.) jointly elaborate 
policy tools, analytical models and technical solutions (e.g. specific risk algorithms, 
emission trading certificates or funded pension schemes) and promote – in a distinctly 
endogenous process of knowledge, identity and ‘preference’ generation – a policy tool 
as suitable and appropriate problem solution (Voß & Simons, 2014; Béland & Howlett, 
2016; Simons & Voß, 2017). 
Legitimacy-seeking claims have long been central for scholars of the politics of 
evaluation, too. They argue that ‘political pressures’ taint any purely instrumental con-
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ceptualisation or use of analytical frameworks (Weiss, 1973). Policymakers can adopt 
evaluations selectively and strategically, they argue, to “provide support for policies 
decided on the basis of intuition, professional experience, self-interest, organizational 
interest, a search for prestige… [or] to buttress an existing point of view” (Weiss, Mur-
phy-Graham & Birkeland, 2005, pp. 13 f.; similar points are made in the newer discus-
sion on the politics of evaluation by Bjørnholt & Larsen, 2014, p. 407; Raimondo, 
2018, p. 34). Whilst Carol Weiss, Erin Murphy-Graham and Sarah Birkeland (2005) 
examine mainly ex-post evaluation, comparative scrutiny of RIA confirms similar 
“symbolic” – or in my typological language legitimatory – uses of ex-ante evaluation 
tools in EU member states (Radaelli, 2005; 2010).  
4.2 ‘Trust in numbers’ and institutional risk management  
Key works on the (political) sociology of quantification help us go beyond a general 
assumption of legitimatory efforts and symbolic policy-making. This so far often ig-
nored literature (from the viewpoint of policy and policy tool studies) specifies how 
and why ex-ante evaluation appeals as legitimacy booster: ‘trust in numbers’ rallies ex-
ternal support for an organisation and enables it to risk-manage its own mandate vis-à-
vis accountability demands.  
Theodore Porter (1995), for example, describes quantification in administrative de-
cision-making as a strategy for organisations to counter ascribed legitimacy deficits. 
Where one’s authority to decide over specific policy issues meets doubt quantification 
becomes an important “technology of trust” (ibid., p. 15): 
“A decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the appearance 
of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity ... provides an answer to a moral demand for impar-
tiality and fairness. Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity 
lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.” (ibid, p. 8) 
Porter’s vivid example is the introduction of the first ex-ante evaluation tool there was: 
CBA in the early 19th century by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (a body responsi-
ble for planning and executing drainage, levee and canal projects). Somewhat paradox-
ically perhaps, the expert regulator turned to ex-ante evaluation precisely because its 
bureaucratic expert regulation did not enjoy enough legitimacy within the political sys-
tem. CBA became a strategy of convincing Congress, the Courts, and potential oppo-
nents in competing departments that the Corps’ funding decisions on water projects 
were reasonable, fair, and politically unbiased. Such isomorphic dynamics also feature 
for our illustrative example of risk analysis: in the UK case, its “apparent objectivity 
and transparency could be used to explain the allocation of resources, in a way which 
was well tested and trusted by the business community” (Hutter, 2005, pp. 2 f.).  
Importantly, however, the political sociology of quantification goes beyond a con-
ceptualisation of “symbolic” uses of ex-ante evaluation. When Porter argues that the 
wide-spread trust in numerical evidence enabled the Corps to position itself as legiti-
mate regulator, I suggest, he reaches beyond mere symbolism and window-dressing. 
Like the politics of evaluation literature he highlights the strategic institutionalising 
role of analytical frameworks for organisations in complex multi-lateral policy do-
mains (Raimondo, 2018; Jankauskas & Eckhard, 2019). Scholars of risk-based deci-
sion-making perceive risk analysis as chief organisational strategy for such institution-
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alising processes. Ex-ante analysis helps specifying one’s mandate, activities, and deci-
sion-making processes vis-à-vis the (perceived) expectations of those who can effec-
tively blame an organisation7. In addition to abstract legitimacy gains, ex-ante evalua-
tion hence helps policymakers define “the parameters of blame” (Black, 2005, p. 520) 
or their own “limits of governance” (Rothstein, Borraz & Huber, 2013). Organisations 
pro-actively manage their own “institutional risks” by stating the limits of their goals 
and activities upfront, based on forms of analysis that count as rigorous and objective 
(ibid., pp. 99-103).  
An example for such legitimacy-seeking is once more the British Health and Safety 
Executive. When under pressure to cut costs during recent austerity programs, the 
agency shifted the focus of its long-established risk-analytical framework from cost-
effective problem-solving to one of managing the parameters for being blameable for 
non-detected health and safety risks at workplaces (Demeritt, Rothstein, Beaussier, & 
Howard, 2015, on a similar argument for German work safety inspection see Paul, 
2016). 
4.3 Institutional contexts to favour legitimacy-seeking appeals 
Two strands of institutional conditions will shape the extent to which legitimacy-
seeking matters in the adoption of ex-ante evaluation. The first is a strong perception 
among public administration bodies as being confronted with severe institutional risks 
(Rothstein, Huber & Gaskell, 2006), for example due to increased budgetary pressures, 
a heightened problem load (for example after a focusing event) or perceived regulatory 
failure and scandals (Hutter, 2005). Comparative risk regulation research confirms that 
pressure from business and public opinion, as well as the allocation suggests of ac-
countability for dealing with residual risk, shapes the extent of institutional risk percep-
tions in a public administration body (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001).  
Second, a legitimacy-seeking perspective is more likely to emerge where public 
administration bodies experience structural pressure on their mandate. Institutional 
competition between actors over a regulatory mandate is likely, for example, to create 
continuous legitimisation pressure for a respective mandate. Such competition is 
heightened in multi-level settings where the involvement of different levels of deci-
sion-making (subnational, national, EU) but also the inclusion of non-state actors in 
decision-making (corporatist and self-regulatory regimes) reduce the scope for admin-
istrations to govern unilaterally (Loughlin, 2017). Radaelli’s RIA studies suggest that 
minority and coalition governments (Sweden and the Netherlands in his case) are more 
likely to use ex-ante evaluation for ‘symbolic’ reasons (2010, p. 175). He sees a similar 
defensive dynamic for the EU Commission which seeks to “defend its proposals vis-à-
vis a plethora of aggressive stakeholders” by the help of seemingly rigorous ex-ante 
evaluation (ibid.). 
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5 Ideal type P: power-seeking 
The third ideal type forms around the assumption that actors might consider ex-ante 
evaluation as a weapon in power-positional struggles. Based on a joint venture of the 
literatures on policy instrumentation, the politics of evaluation and the political sociol-
ogy of quantification, I show that analytical frameworks can appeal as tools for re-
structuring power relations both between different actors and administrative levels and 
as to the vision of how state, market and society ought to interact.  
5.1 Policy instrumentation as struggle over influence 
To be clear, I do not argue that mainstream policy analysis disregards political power in 
policymaking. Rather, as section 3 highlighted, many analyses treat policy tools more 
generally (Hood, 1983; Hall, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and ex-ante evalua-
tion in particular (Viscusi, 1983; Posner, 2001; Majone, 2010), as rather apolitical and in-
strumentally subordinated to the outcomes of political struggles over policy goals.  
Some scholars of policy tools have, however, acknowledged that the design, choice 
and use of tools is embedded in positional struggles over “whose ox will be gored or 
whose nest will be feathered” (Peters, 2002, p. 554). The instrumentation literature, in 
particular, argues that policy tools always also (re-)define roles and relationships in a 
domain. This is because they imply, at their very core, specific theories about the “rela-
tionship between the governing and the governed” as well as a “condensed form of 
knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2007, p. 1). Not only do policy tools have unintended structuration effects but they can 
be promoted for how they promise to (re-)structure a policy domain and the relation-
ship of actors within it. It is less relevant, for the analytical focus of this article that 
such promises may often be disappointed in practice. The instrument constituencies lit-
erature shares the notion of power-related positional struggles, arguing that endogenous 
constituency-building around instruments inherently entails an envisioning of “shift[s] 
in responsibilities between governmental agencies or organisational departments” (Voß 
& Simons, 2014, p. 739). In both literatures, policy tool adoptions thus (also) become 
politically motivated struggles over influence in policymaking in ways their conven-
tional treatment as technocratic and instrumental fulfillers of policy goals overlooks 
(and in ways which may not easily be discerned empirically).  
5.2 Evaluation tools and strategic influence-seeking  
From a different angle, the politics of evaluation has amply highlighted evaluation 
frameworks’ appeal for actors who are “manoeuvring for advantage and influence” and 
seeking to enhance “the influence of a particular division or department” (Weiss ,1973, 
pp. 180 f.). In a later contribution, Carol Weiss (1993) specified that such “interagency 
and intraagency jockeying for advantage and influence” (p. 95) concerns both 
 
‒ abstract questions of relative power within and between public administration bodies  
‒ and substantial questions about whose values and normative premises get inscribed 
into an evaluation framework (p. 99).  
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Weiss’s first point is detailed in actor-centered analysis of specific ex-ante evaluation 
projects, often situated in institutionalist conceptualisations of international bureaucra-
cies such as the EU Commission. For example, a recent study on the Commission’s 
2015 Better Regulation Reform concludes that, even if sold as a technical device for 
instrumental problem-solving and increased accountability, “the reform has contributed 
to the strategic actorness of the Commission as an international bureaucracy” 
(Jankauskas & Eckhard, 2019, p. 683). Studies on RIA confirm that ex-ante evaluation 
tools may tilt the balance of power towards seemingly technocratic actors within the 
EU, such as the EU Commission’s Secretariat (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2010, see similar 
arguments in the wider literature on the open method of coordination, e. g. Tholoniat, 
2010). This also holds true for our example of risk analytical frameworks: the EU 
Commission has embraced common risk analysis strategically in several domains to 
expand its influence over member states’ administrative decisions de facto in de jure 
weakly integrated domains (for flood risk management see: Paul, Bouder & Wesseling, 
2016; for border control see Paul, 2017).  
5.3 Quantification as a governmental technology of power 
Weiss’s second point – the question of whose norms receive promotion via the specifi-
cation of an evaluation tool – attracts more attention in poststructuralist critiques of di-
verse forms of analysis and related scholarly claims of rationality (e. g. for risk analy-
sis: Viscusi, 1983; Majone, 2010). Without space to review this wide-ranging literature 
here, let me selectively refer to the attempt to deconstruct risk analysis as a political 
project tied to neo-liberal governmentality and its beneficiaries (Ewald, 1986; 
O’Malley, 2004; Stone, 2012). 
The political sociology of quantification discusses how analytical templates help 
constitute processes of (neo-liberal) commodification and simultaneous shifts of au-
thority towards central state bodies. Alain Desrosières (2002), in his Politics of Large 
Numbers, stresses the mutually constitutive relationship between the growth of mathe-
matical analytical models, common market formation and governmental authority over 
populations and subnational state entities. For example, Statistik in Germany did not 
coincidentally emerge in the 19th century when the territory was split up into over 300 
individual states with highly diverse local identities: comparative analyses were per-
ceived as a chief requirement for the desired creation of a common market, a national 
identity and unified nation-state. James Scott’s discussion of the Napoleonic meter8 – 
one of his examples of statutory attempts to increase ‘legibility’ for enhanced governa-
bility – further supports this power-related conceptualisation of analytical and quantifi-
cation techniques. He argues that, as the meter replaced the locally highly fragmented 
measurement practices with a common standard, it induced not only a more effective 
common market but also enabled far-reaching administrative centralisation: “no effec-
tive central monitoring … [was] possible without standard, fixed units of measure-
ment” in post-revolutionary France (Scott, 1998, p. 30).  
The example of risk-analytical evaluation frameworks suggests a similar govern-
mentality logic to be at play today. In flooding policies, for example, the introduction 
of a common model for risk analysis in 2007 by the EU has induced a paradigm shift 
from security-oriented technical flood defence towards the much less risk-averse ideal 
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of flood risk management in France and Germany (Paul, Bouder & Wesseling, 2016). 
Such studies highlight the Commission’s attempt to present the evaluative framework 
as neutral and a-political all while articulating a desire to change member states’ own 
concepts and normative parameters for enforcement (without, however, interfering 
with their sovereign decision-making). 
5.4 Institutional contexts to favour power-seeking appeals 
Power-seeking around evaluation tools will be relevant for policymakers in any institu-
tional setting that fragments and/or decentralises authorities policymaking and/or im-
plementation. I suggest that it will be pronounced in constitutional multi-level systems 
where the competences for policymaking are constitutionally shared across different 
actors and where decentral execution is not simply granted (and withdrawn) at the 
goodwill of a de jure dominant centre (for the difference between unitary/federalised 
statehood vs. centralisation/decentralisation see Loughlin, 2017).  
Firstly, as for the institutional condition of decentralisation more generally, well-
known arguments about politicians’ wish to increase political ‘control in a bureaucra-
cy’ and overcome implementation gaps (see Dunsire, 1978; for RIA: Radaelli, 2010) 
apply in any setting where policy formulation/decision and implementation are dele-
gated to actors other than those determining policy goal-setting. Control of decentral 
administrative actors is usually wielded either via ministerial hierarchies in regimes 
following the New-Weberian state model (such as Germany or France) or, in the New 
Public Management reform countries (such as the UK or the US), via strict accounta-
bility patterns between principal and agent (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Paul, 2016 
for German risk-based policy-making). Wherever there is a structural need for central 
level policymakers to ensure vertical policy control in the administrative setting, cen-
tral level actors will likely value ex-ante evaluation frameworks as tools to align decen-
tral autonomous activities with central-level priorities.  
Procedural standards and policy-analytical tools in particular are widely conceived 
of as tools of softly-induced and non-coercive behaviour change which enable central 
governments to “pre-dispose” (Balla, 1998) subcentral actors’ use of discretion (see the 
discussion of behavioural policymaking and „soft paternalism“: Strassheim & Beck, 
2019). The soft manipulation of autonomous subcentral administrative activities 
through ex-ante evaluation is more likely in policy domains where central level actors 
– be it an EU Directorate General or a Federal Ministry – possess the actual power to 
coerce policy tools onto lower levels. The adoption of ex-ante evaluation tools within 
multi-level administrations will hence vary with the respective supra-national and na-
tional level government’s power and appetite to shape subcentral policy execution.  
This segues into my second claim of institutional variation. With a view on varia-
ble territorial state organisation, we can assume that power-seeking rationales vested in 
ex-ante evaluation in decentralised but unitary states will focus on confirming the sta-
tus quo of power relations (central level authority as constitutionally granted ultimo ra-
tio) rather than seeking to re-arrange formal decision-making powers per se. Instead, 
from a power-seeking perspective, the political currency of analytical evaluation will 
increase in contexts of constitutionally limited central control where neither hierarchy 
nor strict accountability bind sub-central executive decision-making. This is typically 
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(but variably so) the case of federal polities and those integrated in stronger forms of 
regional integration of policymaking, such as member states in the EU setting. As 
scholars of federalism and multi-level governance explain, substantial policymaking in 
such settings increases coordination requirements between actors and therefore also 
carries with it the need to constantly negotiate one’s relative authority and power vis-á-
vis others (Benz, 2009; Benz, Corcaci & Doser, 2016). I suggest that, in such settings, 
policymakers will therefore favour uses of analytical tools which promote their own 
realm as the best locus of policymaking and enforcement in multi-level settings.  
6 A research agenda on varieties of ex-ante evaluation 
This article systematised existing conceptualisations of how and why ex-ante evaluation 
appeals to public administrations. It provided an integrated conceptual framework with 
analytical space for instrumental problem-solving perspectives alongside more political 
explanations of legitimacy- or power-seeking. In line with those highlighting that any 
‘rift’ between rationalist and constructivist views on the role of evidence in policymaking 
is ‘obsolete’ (Strassheim, 2017, p. 238), my typology includes instrumental alongside 
non-instrumental rationalities and suggests that their specific weighting is shaped against 
policymakers’ perceptions of how to best navigate (and even restructure) their specific 
institutional contexts (summary in table 1). My unified analytical framework has at least 
four implications for how the research agenda on ex-ante evaluation in public administra-
tions might move forward, especially in comparative endeavours. 
 
Table 1: Three idealtypical appeals of ex-ante policy evaluation 
 Instrumental 
problem-solving 
Legitimacy-seeking Power-seeking 
Logic of consequentiality appropriateness influence 
Motivation wish to solve policy problem wish to defend mandate wish to expand influence 
Expected 
performance 
of ex-ante 
evaluation 
analysis helps screen best solu-
tion before decision-making and 
thus increase effectiveness & 
efficiency of policymaking 
‘trust in numbers’ and appear-
ance of rigorous analysis justi-
fies one’s decision-making & 
secures one’s mandate against 
criticism/competition 
analytical frameworks help pre-
dispose and control others’ de-
cision-making; analytical har-
monisation can bypass political 
fragmentation or even induce 
harmonisation 
Favourable 
Institutional 
 contexts 
dominance of anticipatory policy 
style; openness to scientific ex-
pertise, rationality drive and ex-
istence of strong evaluation cul-
ture in a policy domain; non-
partisan and hierarchically struc-
tured civil service 
strong perception of legitimacy 
pressure (e.g. through stake-
holder pressure or public opin-
ion, or competition with other 
actors over a mandate); tem-
plates for ex-ante evaluation 
available and activatable (e.g. 
via coordination for a) 
coercive powers over/ ability to 
tilt incentive structures for other 
actors favour control of bureau-
cracy; multi-level governance 
settings produce desire to con-
trol policy substance and ad-
vance one’s own influence vis-
à-vis others 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
First, if we understand the adoption of ex-ante evaluation as an institutionally embed-
ded act of selective meaning-making, it follows that a nominally similar analytical 
method can display highly variable appeals across countries, over time, but also – and 
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this is often less attended to – across policy sectors within the same jurisdiction. This 
requires overcoming methodological nationalism in comparative research on ‘evalua-
tion regimes’ (see Strassheim & Schwab in this special issue) in favour of cross-
sectoral analysis and joins in the longer-standing call to treat policy domains as their 
own analytical category (Döhler, 2015).  
Second, analytical attention in future research ought to be paid to interaction pat-
terns and dynamics of I, L or P types of ex-ante evaluation. The unified typology 
would be grossly misconceived if it were taken to mean ‘everything matters’. Instead, 
it encourages ideal type-based analytical strategies for identifying patterns within com-
plex variety. Rather than justifying a relaxation of comparative analytical rigor, my ty-
pology offers a steppingstone towards systematic cross-contextual analyses and further 
theorisation of ex-ante evaluation in policymaking: are there specific patterns of ILP 
interaction in specific domains or countries? Does ex-ante evaluation lean towards spe-
cific combinations of I, L, or P in any temporally staggered manner? Is one prerequisite 
or hindrance for another and, if so, in which specific institutional contexts? Indeed, my 
own work on risk analysis in the German public administration suggests that policy-
makers in multi-level governance settings turn to evaluation tools to clear the decks off 
legitimacy and power struggles in order to enable serious problem-solving in the first 
place (Paul, 2021/fc). 
These are not only theoretically interesting queries. Rather, comparative work evi-
dences that policymakers’ dominant orientations for tool choice durably affects the 
ways in which a tool is institutionalised in policymaking and unfolds implications for 
policy outcomes as well as the attribution of legitimacy and power in a domain (for 
RIA: Radaelli, 2010; for risk analysis Rothstein et al., 2019).  
Third, comparative explorations with the ILP typology can help clarify the role of 
actors in the adoption and diffusion of ex-ante evaluation9. While my contribution did 
not provide a nuanced conceptualisation of actors (see endnote 3) idealtypical analysis 
with the ILP framework can well explore whether and why specific actors are inclined 
to develop a particular ideal-typical interpretation of an evaluative tool. Such actor-
centered analysis might well find that civil servants, higher-rank political actors such as 
ministers or EU commissioners, external evaluators or technical experts in a domain 
adopt different interpretive frameworks on the merits of ex-ante evaluation and could 
further also examine their relative influence in decision-making.  
Last, despite its focus on contextual variation and institutional patterning the ILP 
framework neither wants to nor can be a predictive model of ex-ante evaluation. The 
interpretivist paradigm treats complex contexts as dynamic infrastructures which can 
be mobilised or immobilised, amplified or muted in meaning-making processes (e.g., 
Stone, 2012; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). While institutional environments shape 
the relative plausibility of instrumental, legitimatory and power-oriented perceptions of 
ex-ante evaluation, this context does not fully pre-determine actors’ interpretations of 
the benefits of such analytical methods. As the whole policy process, ex-ante evalua-
tion methods, therefore, ought to be analysed as “context-in-use” (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 
110 f.); as the dynamic, always-preliminary and unpredictable results of contextually 
filtered but selective meaning-making processes. 
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Notes 
 
1 Scholarly elaborations on planning, programming and budgeting system models (PPBS) – an analyti-
cal approach to decide how to spend public money – stood at the cradle of a mushrooming policy-
analytical industry in the US (prominently: Lasswell 1971; Turnpenny, Jordan, Benson & Rayner, 
2015). 
2 This judgement call before decision-making arguably also renders ex-ante evaluation less politically 
sensitive than ex-post evaluation of policy programmes. 
3 For better legibility, this article uses the term policymakers as a shorthand for all actors in a politico-
administrative regime involved in the adoption of ex-ante evaluation tools. 
4 I discuss how this relates to existing typologies in section 2. 
5 Hood (1983) is well prepared to accept that the large variety of potential tools fit to do the job opens 
tool choice up for political struggles. But he insists that the conception of rationality matters at least 
“up to a point” (p. 135). 
6 Majone calls this “procedural rationality”. 
7 The notion of “laying blame at someone’s door” features prominently already in the seminal study on 
“Risk and Culture” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983, p. 38). 
8 While James Scott’s study describes striking instances of control failure, the historic episode on the 
meter can be interpreted as a case of successfully increases ‘legibility’. 
9 I thank one anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point 
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